A central debate in philosophy and neuroscience pertains to whether PFC activity plays an essential role in the neural basis of consciousness. Neuroimaging and electrophysiology studies have revealed that the contents of conscious perceptual experience can be successfully decoded from PFC activity, but these findings might be confounded by post- perceptual cognitive processes, such as thinking, reasoning, and decision-making, that are not necessary for con- sciousness. To clarify the involvement of the PFC in consciousness, we present a synthesis of research (...) that has used intracranial electrical stimulation (iES) for the causal modulation of neural activity in the human PFC. This research provides compelling evidence that iES of only certain prefrontal regions (i.e., orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingu- late cortex) reliably perturbs conscious experience. Conversely, stimulation of anterolateral prefrontal sites, often con- sidered crucial in higher-order and global workspace theories of consciousness, seldom elicits any reportable alterations in consciousness. Furthermore, the wide variety of iES-elicited effects in the PFC (e.g., emotions, thoughts, and olfactory and visual hallucinations) exhibits no clear relation to the immediate environment. Therefore, there is no evidence for the kinds of alterations in ongoing perceptual experience that would be predicted by higher-order or global workspace theories. Nevertheless, effects in the orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortices suggest a specific role for these PFC subregions in supporting emotional aspects of conscious experience. Overall, this evidence presents a challenge for higher-order and global workspace theories, which commonly point to the PFC as the basis for con- scious perception based on correlative and possibly confounded information. (shrink)

There are two broad classes of empirical theories of consciousness, which I will call the biological and the functional. The biological approach is based on empirical correlations between experience and the brain. For example, there is a great deal of evidence that the neural correlate of visual experience is activity in a set of occipetotemporal pathways, with special emphasis on the infero-temporal cortex. The functionalist approach is a successor of behaviorism, the view that mentality can be seen as tendencies to (...) emit certain behavioral outputs given certain sensory inputs. The trouble with behaviorism is that it did not allow that mental states were causes and effects, but functionalists do allow this. They characterize consciousness in terms of its causal role: the causal influence on it from inputs and other mental states, and its causal efficacy with respect to other mental states and behavior. The central idea of functionalism is a proposal about the concept of consciousness, but scientific functionalists have filled the view in with empirical details—the idea is that a representation is conscious if it is broadcast in a global neuronal workspace. The functional approach says consciousness is a role, whereas the biological approach says consciousness is a realizer of that role. For example, one could take solubility to be a role—dissolving in certain circumstances—or, as with the biological view of consciousness, the physico-chemical configuration that has that role. The. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s perspectivism has received restricted and unrestricted interpretations. The latter take the cognitive effects of ‘perspectives’ to be pervasive and general; the former argue they are restricted to special subject matters, have limited effects, or are not essentially cognitive at all. I argue on textual grounds that Nietzsche was committed to the unrestricted view. Comparison to A.W. Moore’s treatment of perspectival representation in Points of View illuminates both the nature of perspectivism and key arguments needed to defend it. Nietzschean perspectivism (...) must deny the very possibility of absolute representations (sensu Moore), and to do so, it must block a form of argument that promises to integrate perspectival representations into progressively less restricted, and ultimately absolute, representations of the world. Such arguments depend on a strong assumption about the unity of the independent world, which Moore accepts and Nietzsche denies. Nietzsche’s pluralism about perspectives thereby turns out to rely on pluralism about the world, which shapes his understanding of us as essentially bounded cognitive agents. Nietzsche holds that the longing for absolute representation manifest in Moore, Leibniz, and many other philosophers, which aspires to overcome the limitations of perspective, amounts to ascetic self-denial about our cognitive condition. (shrink)

Locke is the first English philosopher to be considered in this series, and that fact of itself is worthy of attention. Philosophy, of course, like science, knows no frontiers and no national boundaries. Yet it is true to say that Locke’s contribution to philosophy is typically and peculiarly English. His moderation, his emphasis upon experience, his tolerant spirit of compromise, his dislike of mystical extravagance and of metaphysical speculation, even that elusive quality of his which people call his “common sense”, (...) are English traits. His very defects, illogicality leading to inconsistency and an awkward disorderliness of thought so abhorrent to the. (shrink)

A blatant contradiction seems to characterize the first part of DA II 12: 424a24-25 entails that possession of the power to ‘receive forms without the matter’ is sufficient for being a sense organ, while the ‘wax simile’ supposedly preceding it (424a19-23) attributes the same power to both senses and wax blocks. To solve the contradiction, I contend that Aristotle does not in fact endorse the described ‘wax simile’. He offers, instead, a ‘signature simile’ between the forms received by senses and (...) the analogously matterless signatures transmitted by signet rings. This reading is supported by the use of the clause ‘forms without matter’ in Aristotle’s Corpus, which consistently refers to causally powerless and metaphysically sterile abstractions. I accordingly contend that the reception of perceptible forms without matter only describes the mental dimension of perception, and that the idea has no implications whatsoever with regard to physiology. The resulting attempt at capturing the mental aspect of perception is original and philosophically interesting: no unanalysable opposition of the mental to the physical is postulated, and currently crucial notions like ‘consciousness’ or ‘intentionality’ are playing no role at all. (shrink)

Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I briefly explain three versions of these arguments from evil (two from William Rowe and one from Paul Draper) and the three versions of skeptical theism tailor-made to block them (from Stephen Wykstra, Michael Bergmann, (...) and Peter van Inwagen). (shrink)

At 195B 9 it is pointed out that the Wax Block theory does not cover that large class of judgments in which no sense-objects are concerned, e.g. judgments about numbers. How can we make the mistake of judging that 7 + 5 = 11?The simile of the Aviary, now introduced, is very simple. It illustrates the difference between potential knowledge and actual knowledge, i.e. between knowledge at our disposal, because it has been learnt and stored away in the mind, (...) and knowledge present and ‘alive’ at the moment. The theory is that when we make a mistake about the sum of 7 and 5 we are ‘hunting for’ the knowledge of 12, which we ‘possess’ as we might possess a bird in a cage, but which we have not ‘got about us’ ; but we mis-take, wrongly take our knowledge of 11, i.e. we call up before our mind a different piece of knowledge. (shrink)

I argue that (a) donations made without the option of selling are morally diminished and (2) selling such items isn.

In the early twentieth century, many philosophers in America thought that time should be taken seriously in one way or another. George P. Adams (1882-1961) argued that the past, present and future are all real but only the present is actual. I call this theory ‘actualist eternalism’. In this paper, I articulate his novel brand of eternalism as one piece of his metaphysical system and I explain how he argued for the view in light of the best explanations of temporal (...) experience and the present. I argue that his exploitation of analogies between time and modality offer some lessons for current debates about time such as the importance of providing a temporal epistemology. I also extract what I call the temporal boundary problem and argue that it gives rise to an unaddressed challenge for presentists and growing block theorists. (shrink)

Do conceivability arguments work against physicalism if properties are causal powers? By considering three different ways of understanding causal powers and the modality associated with them, I will argue that most, if not all, physicalist powers theorists should not be concerned about the conceivability argument because its conclusion that physicalism is false does not hold in their favoured ontology. I also defend specific powers theories against some recent objections to this strategy, arguing that the conception of properties as powerful blocks (...) conceivability arguments unless a rather implausible form of emergence is true. (shrink)

We are accustomed to the claim that appropriate backing must be available if criticism is to be justifiable. For example, if someone criticises a film he must be prepared to cite the criteria he is using and to show how they are or are not satisfied by the film. Such processes of evaluation have frequently been investigated: what has been less thoroughly sexplored is the right to criticise itself. Certainly, questions of the appropriate backing for critical utterances have bearing on (...) the right to criticise , for one way of denying that a person has that right is to deny that he can provide the appropriate backing for his criticism. But the question of his right is a wider one, since the attempt to criticise may be blocked before the question of backing can arise at all. It is therefore worthwhile to explore the right to criticise with a view to discovering in what circum-stances it is defeasible. I shall be concerned mainly with the moral right to criticise as investigation of the legal right would raise issues for specialists in the laws of libel and slander. (shrink)

Maladapting Minds discusses a number of reasons why philosophers of psychiatry should take an interest in evolutionary explanations of mental disorders and, more generally, in evolutionary thinking. First of all, there is the nascent field of evolutionary psychiatry. Unlike other psychiatrists, evolutionary psychiatrists engage with ultimate, rather than proximate, questions about mental illnesses. Being a young and youthful new discipline, evolutionary psychiatry allows for a nice case study in the philosophy of science. Secondly, philosophers of psychiatry have engaged with evolutionary (...) theory because evolutionary considerations are often said to play a role in defining the concept of mental disorder. The basic question here is: Can the concept of mental disorder be given an objective definition, or is it rather a normative concept? Thirdly and finally, evolutionary thinking in psychiatry has often been a source of inspiration for a philosophical view on human nature. Thus evolutionary psychiatrists have suggested, for example, that man's vulnerability to mental disorders may well be one of the defining features of our species. -/- Written by leading authors in philosophy, psychiatry, biology and psychology, this volume illustrates that many debates in contemporary philosophy of psychiatry are profoundly influenced by evolutionary approaches to mental disorders. Conversely, it also reveals how philosophers can help contribute to the burgeoning field of evolutionary psychiatry. It is important reading for a wide range of readers interested in mental health care and philosophy. (shrink)

Many scholars view political contractarianism as a distinctly modern account of the foundations of political order. Ideas such as popular sovereignty, the right of revolution, the necessity of the consent of the governed for rightful political authority, natural equality, and a pre-civil state of nature embody the modern rupture with classical political philosophy and traditional Christian theology. At the headwaters of this modern revolution stands Thomas Hobbes. Since the American founders subscribed to the social contract theory, they are often said (...) to reject classical political philosophy and traditional Christian political theology as well. In America on Trial, Robert Reilly rejects the usual argument. He maintains that the building blocks of the American founding originate in medieval Christian political theology. In this essay, I argue that a morally and metaphysically realist contractarian tradition—one that affirms natural equality, the authority of the society over government, the necessity of consent for legitimate government, the right to resist tyrannical rulers, and the idea of a pre-civil state of nature—predates Hobbes and also that the voluntarist contractarian tradition inaugurated by Hobbes is self-referentially incoherent. A coherent political contractarianism logicially depends on the sort of metaphysics and moral ontology Hobbes rejects. (shrink)

Philosophers of action have rarely systematically thought about acts of communication as special sorts of actions, nor have speech act theorists looked on the bearings of the general theory to action on linguistic acts. This dissertation represents an attempt to work seriously within precisely that intersection of action theory and speech act theory. Some problematic issues in both areas can, from this combined perspective, be reformulated more clearly than they have been previously articulated. ;The first part of the thesis examines (...) linguistic communication as a subspecies of action, formulating a unifying theoretical description of speech and action. The distinction between constitutive rules and regulative rules turns out to parallel a distinction between basic actions and nonbasic actions; I explore the usefulness of the concept of level-generation and basic actions in the context of the theory of linguistic communication, arguing for a conception of basic speech acts. ;The second part of the thesis provides a theory of demonstrative utterances. A demonstrative utterance is simply an utterance accompanied by a demonstrative gesture. The account offered supplies a speech act-like analysis of demonstrative as well as an action-theoretical analysis of the gestures which accompany demonstrative utterances. This theory addresses and answers many of the questions raised by Kaplan and passes beyond them to offer insight into the communicative aspects of demonstrative uses of expressions. I extend this analysis to cover the wider class of all utterances accompanied by relevant gestures as a prologue to the more comprehensive study of nonverbal communicative behavior. ;In the third part I show how the concepts of the unified theory developed in parts I and II, form the building blocks of a general theory of nonverbal communicative behavior. I examine the structure of statements about meaningful action and nonverbal behavior as well as the properties of the behavior itself. I argue that only accounts which include elements of both action theory and the theory of communication can successfully explain the nature of nonverbal communicative behavior as the sort of action that is properly said to be meaningful. (shrink)

Through staged photographs in which she herself is often the lead actor or through appropriation of historical photographs, contemporary African American artist Carrie Mae Weems deconstructs the shaming of the black female body in American visual culture and offers counter-hegemonic images of black female beauty. The mirror has been foundational in Western theories of subjectivity and discussions of beauty. In the artworks I analyze in this article, Weems tactically employs the mirror to engage the topos of shame in order to (...) reject it as a way of seeing the self and to offer a new way of lovingly seeing the self. I use the work of Kelly Oliver, Helen Block Lewis, and bell hooks to articulate the relationships among the mirror, shame, and black female subjectivity in Weems's work. Weems's subjects often reckon with what Oliver calls “social melancholy” as they experience shame while standing before the mirror. However, Weems also shows that by looking again—a critical strategy I explain using Oliver's model of “the loving eye”—her subjects can use the mirror as a corrective to the social shaming gaze and make it a stage for establishing black female subjectivity, a gaze of self-love, and beauty. (shrink)

          Despite the fact that the strength of argument is clearly on the pro-life side—nobody except a handful of academics would question the grave wrongness of abortion were pregnancy never inconvenient—somehow ordinary intelligent people, like our students, often remain unconvinced. There are many reasons for this, of course. For instance, a number of students have had their children aborted while many know others who have had abortions, and one does not want (...) to condemn oneself or oneÂ’s friends. I am a philosopher, however, and so I will be interested in intellectual reasons, even though these subjective psychological ones are almost surely more important. Specifically, I will be interested in the fact that the ordinary person subscribes to a number of erroneous big-picture ethical beliefs, each of which, to a different degree, does something to block access to the pro-life arguments. I will not talk about all such erroneous beliefs and I would be grateful in the discussion for more examples.           I will talk about eight errors I have identified, largely through teaching. For each one, I will identify the error, show how it impacts the pro-life message and explain why it is tempting to most of us —there is, after all, something right about five of the errors. For each of these errors is one that we might ourselves be tempted by on occasion. I will then suggest some ways of refuting the error. In some cases, the mere identification of the error should do the trick, as these erroneous beliefs are often not explicitly identified by our interlocutors. My suggested refutations will not always be phrased in the way in which I would phrase them for didactic effectiveness: in this talk, I am mainly trying to convey ideas. (shrink)

R.I.G Hughes offers the first detailed and accessible analysis of the Hilbert-space models used in quantum theory and explains why they are so successful.

Essentialism is one of the most pervasive problems in mental health research. Many psychiatrists still hold the view that their nosologies will enable them, sooner or later, to carve nature at its joints and to identify and chart the essence of mental disorders. Moreover, according to recent research in social psychology, some laypeople tend to think along similar essentialist lines. The main aim of this article is to highlight a number of processes that possibly explain the persistent presence and popularity (...) of essentialist conceptions of mental disorders. One such process is the general tendency of laypeople to essentialize conceptual structures, including biological, social, and psychiatric categories. Another process involves the allure of biological psychiatry. Advocating a categorical and biological approach, this strand of psychiatry probably reinforced the already existing lay essentialism about mental disorders. As such, the question regarding why we essentialize mental disorders is a salient example of how cultural trends zero in on natural tendencies, and vice versa, and how both can boost each other. (shrink)

Struve's book inspires sympathy both for its thought and its form. The thought tries to "grasp speculatively the mystical experience"; the form, to restore the aphorism, "reflection out of the disorder." As suggested in the title--The Other Draught--something draws our thinking initially out of its confusion. Unable to say what it is, we can only witness that "it draws." The main theme appears thus to be the departure from attained positions: the Other within and behind present things, although present but (...) not a thing, urges readjustment of all re-presentations. Its address claims an answer, first of all astonishment. Struve's challenge is to translate the personal condition of a reply into philosophical discourse. One is not surprised to learn that he has abundantly commented upon Kierkegaard. The experience of the ineffable splinters the system, but a syntax is necessary to keep it from being dumb. The aphorism is the speech of the unspeakable. The main issues of the phenomenological tradition are reinterpreted in maxims of from two words to twenty lines. "The miracle: all that is I can transcend; I can thus be totally alone."--"A definition of man: the living being that can be totally alone."--"Dream is spell. While one is dreaming, one is in a peculiar way spellbound by oneself within oneself."--"To say yes means to pronounce the reality; I say yes to something, that means: I declare it real."--"Shaping of a world: abode."--"I am not myself; the same paradox as: all is not all." Often the reader feels carried back into the German mystical tradition, at other moments, the texts look like a professor's summarizing of Phenomenology for College students--or for a block-almanac. Triviality indeed sometimes threatens. The chapters are always organized around three concepts: "Finitude, imagehood, worldliness."--"Solitude, bareness, openness."--"Forgetfulness, sensuousness, memory...." An appendix gives notes from voyages to Norway and Egypt. These pages describe life abroad as the symbol of the existence itself: torn out of the familiar, thrown into the undisclosable.--The [[sic]] author, whose lectures we have enjoyed in Freiburg, Germany, moves apart from the desire for public recognition. The strange peacefulness of his book, when shipped over to a busy continent, becomes a peaceful stranger amidst noisy struggles for the survival of philosophy.--R. S. (shrink)